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China and Regional Integration in East Asia: 
Opportunities, Constraints and Challenges 
 
 
Li Xing1 & Zhang Shengjun2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Regional integration in East Asia 
Over the past decades, topics of regional integration have become part of the 
focus and interest of development studies. Among them, the regional integration 
of East Asia3 has appeared prominently in these researches. Within the various 
domains of development studies, East Asia has been applied as valuable 
comparative parameters due to a number of its significant characteristics (see 
table 1): 
 
• East Asia has the world’s largest regional market of almost 2 billion 
populations, and it is many times bigger than the 27-EU 495 million and 
NAFTA 405 million populations.  
• East Asia has been since the 1960s the fastest growing region in the world. 
Over the last two decades the region has an average annual economic growth 
rates of around 7%, which is much higher that the average 5% growth in the 
rest of the world. 
• East Asia has historically had a high domestic savings rate of about 20-45% 
(it is different from country to country). It is much higher than the EU’s 
average of about 20%.  
• East Asia holds over half the world’s foreign exchange reserves. China alone 
has the world largest foreign exchange reserve which passed $1.4 trillion in 
2007. 
• Along with the NAFTA and the EU, East Asia is one of the world’s three 
largest economically integrated regions. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1   Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of History, International and Social Studies, 
Aalborg University, Denmark. 
2   Ph.D., Professor, Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Beijing 
Normal University, China. 
3  The geographical notion of East Asia is defined in various ways. Some refer it to the Far 
East, others refer it to Northeast Asia excluding Southeast Asia. Here, the notion of  East 
Asia means the “eastern part of Asia” including Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
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Table 1. Selected indicators of the three largest regional economic blocs 
 
 
(Source: Akhtar, 2004:2) 
 
Largely inspired by the intense curiosity on this first successful case of rapid 
industrialization outside the Western cultural sphere, the East Asian newly 
industrialized economies became the object of various academic studies and 
interpretations. The World Bank had invested on a special study report on The 
East Asian Miracle (1993), which generated a global debate on the various 
factors behind the East Asian success. 
 
The regional integration process in East Asia can be historically traced back to 
the Japanese project of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”4 during the 
Second World War and the flying-geese5 phenomenon in the 1950s-1980s. In 
both cases Japan played a leading role, for good and bad, in regional economic 
integration, and economies in the region were moving ahead together in layers 
with Japan at the front layer. The flying-geese pattern of regional economic 
                                                          
4  Japan made the first attempt to lead Asian countries before the Second World War. At that 
time, the Japanese Government embarked on a brutally expansionist policy the result of 
which was creation of the first gaggle of “flying geese” under the name of the “Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” During the “flight” Japan militarily invaded and brutally 
ruled most of the countries in the region, and forcefully imposed its own worldviews and 
values on the rest of the region. At the same time, the Japanese Government assumed 
hostile attitude toward Western countries. Japan’s defeat in the Second World War 
signified the end of flight of the first “flying-geese” gaggle. 
5  The hypothesis of the flying-geese and ladder-patterned of intra-regional economic 
relations suggests that a group of nations in this region are flying together in layers with 
Japan at the front layer. The layers/ladders signify the different stages of economic 
development achieved in various countries. In the flying-geese model of regional 
economic development, Japan as the leading goose leads the second-tier geese (second 
generation of newly industrializing economies) which, in their turn, are followed by the 
third-tier geese (third generation of newly industrializing economies). 
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development and industrial relations led to sustained economic growth and 
spatial expansion in this region. 
 
Despite the fact that since the 1990s economies in East Asia have gradually 
increased their economic interdependence through internal structural reforms 
and external liberalization and have further expanded intra-regional economic 
relations, thus creating a de-facto economic “common market”, the region still 
lacks a strong institutional framework to handle crucial issues which are 
indispensable to economic regionalism, such as political trust, economic 
unbalance, security challenges, trade and financial issues, etc. A solid regional 
institutional structure is becoming more and more important especially through 
the lesson of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
 
The European regional integration was historically originated and driven by the 
desire to foster political and social cohesion. Interdependence in political and 
economic ties within the EU is seen as an effective way to resolve security 
conflicts in the region. In retrospect, the institutional evolution of the European 
Union has a history of about 50 years. It is a matter of fact that the engine 
driving the EU project was economic cooperation, beginning with the Bank for 
International Settlements, and then moving to the European Coal and Steel 
Community. Later on the European Common Market was upgraded to the 
European Economic Community and finally to the European Union and the 
Euro Zone.  
 
Seen from the comparative perspectives, East Asia is a region with intensified 
economic interactions and interdependence but without a common political 
mandate and without any institutionalized arrangement of regional integration. 
Even the sub-regional organization, ASEAN, cannot be compared with the 
European Union because it lacks infrastructure and institution to lead the 
process. The three big economies in North East Asia - Japan, China and Korea - 
do not even have a free trade agreement (FTA) among themselves. Although a 
grand vision of regional integration has been presented and there are growing 
sentiments among member countries of East Asia to move towards the direction, 
there are still many difficulties to be resolved. 
 
 
China’s reemergence in East Asia 
In historical retrospect China had been the hegemonic power in the East Asian 
region with tributary relationships with other neighboring countries in the Qing 
dynasty and before. And culturally East Asian region was also heavily 
influenced by Chinese traditional culture including language and philosophies. 
Similar historical and cultural ties hold true for other countries in Southeast Asia 
and for Vietnam in particular. Even in the mid of 19th century China was still the 
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largest economy in the world. But since the mid 19th and early 20th centuries, 
China was overwhelmed by static decay, civil instability, famines, military 
defeats and foreign occupation. During the Cold War period, China’s social 
experiments achieved some progresses but suffered serious setbacks due to the 
internal and external constraints. Since China started the economic reform in late 
1970s, the world witnesses the return of China’s emergence as a regional and 
global political and economic power. According to the report of the IMF, the 
balance of power in the world economy is undertaking changes with China 
replacing a faltering United States as the biggest contributor to global growth in 
an “uncertain and potentially difficult period” (Elliott, 2007). 
 
The failure of Japan’s militant implementation of the “flying-geese” 
industrialization in East Asia was connected to its defeat in the Second World 
War and the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949. It is an irony of history 
that a contributing factor to the deformation of Japan’s second leadership of the 
“flying-geese” pattern of regional development is again connected to the rise of 
China as one of the key regional and global economic actor. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s China’s continuous economic dynamism and its constructive 
role in releasing the heavy pressure of the regional financial crisis in 1997 made 
China the engine of regional economic growth. Since then, Japan was gradually 
no longer the central “locomotive” of the regional economic growth.  
 
China’s open-door policy has attracted a large amount of foreign investment and 
many labour-intensive and capital- and technology-intensive industries have 
been moved to China. For instance, Hong Kong has almost moved its entire 
manufacturing industries to Mainland China while continuing to act as a 
financial and service centre. Taiwan and Mainland China have developed 
similar highly dependent economic relations in recent years. As a result of these 
shifts, the regional growth pattern and convergence structure was also beginning 
to change. 
 
In terms of intra-regional economic relations in East Asia, since the 1990s there 
has been a shift away from the previous Japan-led “flying geese” model of 
vertical economic integration structured on the basis of the Japanese investment, 
technological transfer and supply of manufacturing parts in line with a 
hierarchical market exchange and regional division of labour and production 
networks to a new horizontal intra-regional economic integration. According to 
a World Bank study, the economic integration of China in East Asia has a 
positive effect in contributing to economic and trade growth in the region: 
 
The economic integration of China has deepened production fragmentation in 
East Asia to an unprecedented level. The rapid integration of China into 
regional production networks has countered fears that China’s global 
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integration would crowd out the opportunities of other countries for 
international specialization. International production fragmentation has 
intensified the dynamism of East Asian economies and increased economic 
interdependence within the region.  
 
       (Easper, 2007) 
 
The role of overseas Chinese diaspora 
There is a consensus that overseas Chinese diasporas, whose economic power is 
greater than that of any other diasporas of any other states, are one of the main 
economic and financial resources for sustaining China’s economic growth and 
connecting China with the rest of the region since China started its economic 
reform at the end of 1970s. The overseas remittances and investments 
contributed by Chinese diasporas accounted for a substantial proportion of 
China’s growth. It is not an exaggeration to claim that Chinese Diasporas are a 
vital key to China’s economic success as well as to its further integration with 
regional and global economy. 
 
The first wave of foreign direct investment to China was primarily from the 
overseas Chinese who took a pioneering step into China’s premature market in 
face of regulatory uncertainty and political sensitivity and who were willing to 
take the risks of the lack of property law and unclear political systems. After the 
late 1990s and since the 2000s there was a rise of flow of FDI from North 
American and European corporations. Following its membership of the WTO, 
China has to reduce the preferential treatment to the overseas Chinese capitals. 
 
One distinctive feature about the diaspora capitals can been seen from the 
crucial synergy they bring about between overseas investors and markets and 
China’s local development, one not found to the same extent or in the same form 
with non-Chinese FDI (Smart and Hsu, 2004). The diaspora capitals paved the 
most dynamic linkages between diaspora capitalism and entrepreneurship and 
the booming economies of the towns and villages of the coastal regions (Lever-
Tracy, et al, 1996). 
 
The new engine of regional economic growth is driven by FDI-directed supply 
chain which has created a pattern of parallel development for the region in many 
ways. It has not only generated diverse and vibrant networks of local enterprises 
and industries around the whole region, but also further decomposed and 
extended the supply chains geographically. This kind of network-based 
exchange of trade and capital has profound impact to East Asian economic 
convergence because the new situation necessitates governmental cooperation 
and institutional building. One of the key actors in generating dynamic intra-
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regional industrial and economic integrations is the overseas Chinese business 
communities. 
 
Although it has been a consensus that the historical rapid economic growth in 
East Asia was achieved through a regional production networks with close 
production ties with Japan as the key actor of central importance, the role of 
ethnic Chinese business networks (Chinese Diaspora) has increasingly become 
an important integrative driving force in promoting regional economic 
integration not only in terms of being the major source of FDI contributing to 
China’s economic growth but also in terms of being the network connector 
linking the Chinese market with the rest of the region (Peng, 2000). A typical 
phenomenon is that many firms from the developed economies in the region use 
China as low-cost manufacturing based as well as an export base instead of 
directly exporting finished goods to the Western markets. By doing so they have 
moved their productions to China, further enhancing China’s integration in the 
regional economy and leading to the reorganization of industrial relations in 
East Asia. The key actors behind those firms in this process of economic 
regionalization are those ethnic Chinese firms and their business networks which 
act as sources of capital, technology and expertise and bring in business synergy 
between Mainland China and the rest of the region (Crawford, 2000).  
 
The spill-over effect of the regional network-based Chinese capitalism can be 
illustrated by the role of the hundreds of successful ethnic Chinese family 
business and networks connecting and interlocking medium-sized businesses in 
many countries in the region. Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, business 
executives, traders and financiers are the major players linking local economies 
with that of the region. Among the major actors, the Chinese-dominated regions 
such as Hong Kong and Taiwan have been playing a decisive role. Their capital, 
technology, entrepreneurial capability, marketing skills and international trading 
experience matched very well with the advantages of cheap land and abundant 
supply of low-priced disciplined labour in the mainland. Not only in China, 
ethnic Chinese are also major and sometimes prime sources of capital and 
entrepreneurship of most of the Southeast Asian countries. 
 
 
The “China factors” in regional integration 
The rise of China has met different responses from different corners of the 
world. The immediate feelings of China’s impact are nowhere more manifest 
than in Asia where China’s emergence has been felt most strongly due to 
obvious geopolitical and economic factors and cultural and historical ties. 
China’s rapid economic growth and active regional diplomacy have already 
transformed Asia in many ways. Economically, China’s commercial and energy 
ties with all major regions of the world are expanding. China is one of the main 
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driving forces proliferating regional and bilateral trade agreements. Politically, it 
is often interpreted that China seeks to shape the region’s emerging political-
institutional contours and to encourage movement toward an “East Asian 
community” in order to balance the declining influence of the United States.  
 
Dissolution of the flying-geese relations 
China’s “core” position can be explained in this way that the country’s vast size 
and unbalanced development levels between its internal regions with their 
respective levels of industrial stages and comparative advantages enables China 
to cooperate with the rest countries of the region and even the whole world, rich 
and poor, advanced and underdeveloped both vertically and horizontally. This is 
to say that one the one hand, this signifies the unbalanced development of 
China’s domestic economy in different regions, on the other hand, the 
advantages of China’s multi-level economy enable it to cooperate with countries 
of different stages at the same time; and different Chinese provinces can give 
full play to their comparative advantages with all countries in the East Asian 
region. 
 
When global FDI began to horizontally spread to China and other East Asian 
countries, the early Japan-based flying-geese and ladder-patterned intra-regional 
industrial, trade and the linkages with global FDI was transformed into a 
relationship of competition in which countries in this region are competing with 
one another for capital and financial resources as well as for export market. It is 
often the fact that many enterprises and industries in the region are facing direct 
competition with Chinese products. To some scholars, the emergence of China’s 
economic strength was among the factors leading to the shift of financial and 
economic balance of power in the region, which partially contributed to the 
financial crisis in 1997 (Li, et al, 2002).  
 
The rise of China as a global manufacturing centre has a great impact on the 
traditional intra-regional economic relations and division of labour, leading to 
further specialization within various industries and to new divisions of labour 
both vertically and horizontally. Until the 1980s of the 20th century, trade in East 
Asia was patterned on the basis of “north-south trade” in line with comparative 
advantages - namely trade between industries. Since the 1990s, dramatic 
transformations took place in East Asian trade relations. Inter-industrial trade 
was gradually replaced by intra-industrial one which was based on vertical 
division of labour. 
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The figure shows that vertically-based intra-industrial trade in the region 
expanded substantially in East Asia, 
which was partly driven by the global 
trade of spare parts. This also 
indicates the position of East Asia as 
part of global manufacturing 
networks. Transnational companies 
from developed countries such as 
Japan, the United States and the EU 
took advantage from the 
manufacturing networks in East Asia 
and outsourced their labour-intensive 
products to China and ASEAN 
countries for processing and 
assembling. It needs to indicate the 
fact that “this growth dynamism based 
on vertical specialization has 
depended heavily on extraregional 
trade in final goods, and this dependence has increased over the years.” (Easper, 
2007:3) 
 
China’s integration with the global and regional economies made it an ideal base 
for product processing and assembling and a centre of global manufacturing 
networks in East Asia, which further intensified intra-product divisions of labour 
in the region. China’s export-oriented and processing-based trade reveals the 
intensification of its integration in the global vertical division of labour as well 
as its role as an important promoter in the development of intra-regional trade. 
 
However, from a long-term development perspective and despite its further 
advance in manufacturing capacities, China will eventually face many 
challenges following the gradual maturation of manufacturing at a global level. 
The value-added rate of manufacturing will slowly but surely decline, so will the 
role of manufacturing in economic growth. Over dependency on manufacturing 
without other alternative sectors to further promote economic growth would 
slowdown or even stagnate China’s economic development. Therefore, it is 
important for China to initiate policies which help to assist sectoral structural 
adjustment, for example, developing service industries as future growth-driven 
sectors. 
 
China as a new engine for growth 
Since 2000, China’s contribution to global GDP growth almost doubled the 
contribution from the other three newly industrializing economies (India, Brail 
and Russia). According to the World Bank calculation, China’s contribution to 
Figure 1. inter-industrial and intra-
industrial trade ratio in East Asia 
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world economic growth between 1980-2000 period was 14 percent, lower than 
the US 20.7%, but was 7% higher than that of Japan (Japan’s economic growth 
in the 1950s had a great impact on the world economy). China’s figure further 
jumped to 17.5 percent in 2002. The UN “World Economic Situation and 
Prospects for 2003” acknowledged that China has become the "locomotive" for 
Asian economic growth. 
 
China’s contribution to global trade growth shows another indispensable aspect 
of its global and regional dynamism. Ravenous China's oil imports rose by 30% 
in 2003, largest oil import second only to the US. In addition China accounted 
for half of the world's consumption of cement, 30% of its coal, and 36% of its 
steel. Today China is the third largest contributor to the world trade growth after 
the US and the EU. China trade has a decisive effort on the economic and trade 
growth of developing countries. For example, China's overall trade with Africa 
rose from $10.6 billion in 2000 to $40 billion in 2005, and in 2006 the trade 
between China and Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to US$25 billion, which 
accounted for about 85 percent of all African exports to China (Wang, 2007:5). 
However, China's global trade has also a side-effort, namely a tendency towards 
overdependence on foreign market for oil, raw and energy resources, which 
bears far-reaching implications for its national security and sustainable 
economic growth. China has to look for other alternatives in terms of renewable 
energy, innovation and sustainable development. 
 
There is indeed a consensus that China’s economic power especial its growing 
domestic market has become an important force promoting regional economic 
cooperation and trade growth and spurring East Asian economic recovery. In 
Northeast Asia, Japan has acknowledged that its recent economic recovery has 
been due in a large part to its massive exports to the Chinese market shifting its 
traditional trade deficit to surplus. Japan has remained China’s largest trading 
partner and import source as well as third largest export market for 10 
consecutive years. First time in history China (excluding Hong Kong and 
Macao) surpassed the US and became Japan’s largest trading partner in 2007.  
For South Korea, China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) already became its 
top export market in 2003. 
 
The financial crisis in 1997 had substantially deteriorated the regional economy, 
and the region recognized the fact that it was China, not the United States or 
Japan, that played the most important role in the region’s economic recovery. 
During the crisis China refused to devaluate its currency, instead, it drew on its 
extensive foreign exchange reserves to assist distressed nations. In addition, 
China refused to withhold its committed aid to Asian nations that tried to put 
their vulnerable economies in shape.  
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In Southeast Asia, bilateral trade volume between China and nations in this 
region has reached 40 billion US dollars a year and the region’s exports to China 
are bigger than those to any other place in the world. Chinese statistics show that 
from 1990 to 2005, China-ASEAN trade volume surged at an average of 22% on 
year-on-year basis, four percentage points higher than the growth rate of China’s 
overall foreign trade volume in the corresponding period. In 2006 China-
ASEAN trade reached $160.8 billion, a 23.4% increase comparing with the 2005 
figures (Xu, 2006). Currently China and ASEAN are each other’s fourth largest 
trading partners and trade experts estimate that China-ASEAN trade may reach 
the $200 billion target by 2008 (People Daily online, October 30, 2006). China 
and ASEAN countries have been committed to the goal of establishing a free 
trade area by 2010 as scheduled - ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). 
The rise of China changed the East and Southeast regional landscape in two 
ways. On the one hand, China’s new role as a link in the production network 
contributed to the growth of intra-regional trade. On the other hand, China 
became an active player in developing institutional frameworks to promote 
regional integration.  
 
Table 2: The changes of trade flows among countries and regions in East Asia (the ratio 
of export to the trading partners vis-a-vis their total trade volume) 
 
 East Asia China Japan 
Expporting 
Country/regional 
1990-94 2000-04 1990-94 2000-04 1999-94 2000-04 
East Asia 44.1 49.0 6.4 11.1 8.6 8.2 
Indonesia 62.0 56.9 3.6 5.4 32.9 21.0 
Malaysia 54.7 45.2 2.5 5.3 13.6 11.35 
Philippine 36.1 53.7 1.2 4.2 17.4 16.4 
Singapore 48.2 56.4 2.0 6.1 7.8 7.0 
Tailand 41.7 48.3 1.5 5.3 17.3 14.7 
Vietnam — 49.0 — 9.6 — 15.7 
China 60.5 45.3 — — 15.8 14.3 
China-Hong 
Kong 
47.0 55.5 29.9 39.3 5.4 5.4 
China-Taiwan 42.7 55.2 0.0 10.3 11.3 9.2 
Korea 40.8 46.6 4.2 15.6 15.7 9.8 
Japan 34.6 43.1 3.7 10.0 — — 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Database,  International Monetary Fund. ESDS International 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/access/access.asp. 
 
The above table indicates that China has become the centre for trade expansion 
in East Asia. Comparing trade flow figures between 1990-1994 and 2000-2004, 
it shows that 1) intra-regional trade had substantially increased; 2) China 
became the destination of export increase for the region; 3) trade ratio with 
Japan for almost all countries declined. These demonstrate that East Asian trade 
flow in the global manufacturing networks had considerable changes under the 
 11
impact of the rise of China. Some trade flows previously destined to Japan 
turned to China. The intra-regional trade expansion also intensified intra-
regional trade dependency. 
 
There is no dispute today that China is increasingly looked as the locomotive of 
the region’s economic growth and development. While having a large surplus in 
its trade with the United States and the EU, China actually has trade deficits 
with most Asian countries. China’s import is helping to fuel the economic 
recovery and growth of its smaller neighbours. Even Japan has acknowledged 
that its economic recovery last year has been due in a large part to its massive 
exports to the Chinese market. China displaced the United States as the largest 
source of Japan’s imports for the first time ever in August 2001. Due to its 
internal regional differences in economic development, China’s economic 
growth is expected to last for a long period due to the “catching-up” process 
from within. 
 
A positive integration trend led by China-driven regional economic growth is 
confirmed by a research on the spill-over effort on the economic growth in the 
home country generated by openness, market size, and level of development of 
neighbouring countries in the same region. The conclusion of the study verifies 
such an effect described by a scholar that “the economies of countries near large 
and open economies grow faster. Also, the level of development of 
neighbouring economies, especially when they are open, has significant positive 
spill-over effects” (Vamvakidis, 1998:265). For example, according to the study 
by Gaulier (et al, 2005), the China-centered economic regionalism can be seen 
from the reorganization of production in East Asia in which a triangular trade 
pattern emerges in such a way that companies of advanced economies use China 
as “an export base” (exporting intermediate goods to their affiliates in different 
regions in China rather than directly exporting finished products to the US and 
Europe markets), increasing the US and European trade deficits with China 
whereas decreasing their deficits with Japan and the newly industrializing 
economies. 
 
China’s soft power and the need for further improvement 
To play a hegemonic leadership role in shaping policies in the region, political 
and economic power is indispensable, but soft power is imperative. “Soft 
power” is a concept theorized by Joseph Nye (2004) which depicts the role of a 
country (the United States) as a benign hegemon in safeguarding a designated 
projection or objective not through military means but through the influence of 
its culture, political values, foreign policies, and economic attraction as essential 
components of national strength, providing the capacity to persuade other 
nations to willingly to follow the same suit. Nevertheless, the traditional image 
of China as a revolutionary communist country with a communist party still in 
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power is still a psychological and ideological obstacle in accepting China as a 
regional benign hegemon. 
 
It is partially true that China’s achievement is seen by the West as being 
attractive to authoritarian leaders around the world who seek to defend their 
sovereignty and remain in power. However, many democratic regimes in the 
developing world, like India, Brazil and South Africa, also positively assess 
China’s development model in order to meet their own objective of establishing 
a more multilateral world order. Currently the impact of China’s soft power 
development is felt differently in different part of the world, for example, China 
is becoming an appealing partner for Africa, Latin Africa and Middle East; and 
the “Beijing Consensus”6 has become a counter-hegemonic discourse against the 
“Washington Consensus” (Li, 2007). 
 
To speak of China’s role in East Asian regional integration, it is unavoidable to 
talk about China’s soft power. This is because soft power in terms of cultural 
and political influence, human capital and diplomatic relations are indispensable 
elements for the region to accept China’s leadership role in building and 
influencing policy in the region. However, the picture of China’s soft power in 
East Asia is somehow more complicated than it seems to be. 
 
According to the results of a survey of public opinion, Soft Power in Asia Survey 
2008, by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2008, “China’s growing 
economic and military might have not yet been fully translated into the elements 
of soft power that help a nation wield indirect influence in its region and the 
world” (Survey 2008: 4). 
                                                          
6  This notion by Ramo (2004) is referred to the “Chinese developmental model”. This 
model is coined with distinct attitudes to politics, development and the global balance of 
power. It is driven by China’s success in economic development with a strong belief in 
state role and sovereignty and global multilateralism. The concept is often applied in 
contrast to the Washington Consensus. 
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The above figures indicate that most countries surveyed attach a high 
importance to their economic relations with China, no less important than the 
traditional link with the US (fig.1). However, China’s perceived economic 
power has not been fully matched its cultural influence in terms of popular 
culture, political culture, human rights and the rule of law. 
 
 
                  
 
The Chicago Council, Asia Sofot Power Survey 2008,  p.4, 7
The Chicago Council, Asia Soft Power Survey 2008, p. 5
Fig. 2: Importance of economic relations Fig. 3: Influence of Chinese culture 
Fig. 5: China as the leader of AsiaFig. 4: viewing Chinese soft power
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The above figures indicate that the influence of China’s soft power is weaker 
than its economic influence (in Southeast Asia China’s soft power is perceived 
stronger). On the question of China becoming the leader of the region, a 
majority of surveyed believe that China will eventually become the leader of this 
region; however, they also express a high extent of uncertainties regarding the 
idea of China one day becoming the leader of Asia. In order for China to play a 
larger role as a new hegemonic driving force in regional integration in East Asia, 
China still needs to further accumulate soft power. 
 
 
Regional integration without regional security system and institutionalized 
polity 
 
The lack of regional security system 
One of the important differences between East Asia and Europe is that as a 
holistic entity, Europe has developed into such a stage that it begins to show a 
collective willingness and capacity of transcending the Westphalian system of 
nation-state. This was realized partly due to the successful construction of a 
regional security framework – NATO – under the US hegemonic leadership. On 
the contrary, since the mid-19th century colonialization and the mid-20th 
century national liberation as well as rapid economic development since the late-
20th century, many East Asian countries have just entered the historical stage of 
forming a core consciousness of nation-state. Furthermore, since the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and especially since the new century, nationalism or 
nationalistic tendency in East Asia has become more serious. In other words, in 
comparison with the EU the integrative cooperation in East Asia lacks the 
promotion of a transcendent “regional spirit” driven by cultural and ideological 
convictions. 
 
This is to indicate the fact that due to the legacy of the Cold War and the two-
pole confrontational order, the suppressed national consciousness and many 
conflicts related to “sovereignty”, “rights” and “interests” are emerging. Up to 
now, the East Asian region still has shadows of the Cold War in such as way 
that although the ending of the Cold War in East Asia was relatively earlier than 
that in Europe, the region has many unresolved issues left over by the Cold War 
leading to the fact that a higher level of integration is difficult to realize. The 
regional security dilemma is manifested by a number of bilateral contradictions 
between China-US, China-Japan, Japan-Russia, and between middle powers 
such as the two Koreas as well as between big powers and small states such as 
between China and ASEAN countries as well as between small states within the 
ASEAN. Some key powers in the region have bilateral security alliance NOT 
among themselves but WITH the United Sates. The dilemma facing many 
countries in the region is that while nationhood is still closely connected with 
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the identity of nation-state in which “sovereignty” is severely attached to 
“national identity”, or “national interest”, economic and political affairs are 
becoming more and more transnationalized. 
 
The above security dilemma can also be seen from the fact that each country in 
the region has different security policies in terms of containment, prevention or 
alliance leading to many interrelated complications in regional security matters. 
Until now there is no commonly accepted and recognized security system or 
mechanism in controlling and balancing the multiple regional actors, which lead 
to unstable bilateral and multilateral security relations. Hence, security issues are 
unfortunately becoming the key major obstacles in enhancing mutual trust – 
indispensable cement for regional integration. However, following the gradual 
implementation of security dialogue mechanism, the security issues can become 
an impetus to the promotion of regional integration. 
 
Scholars have different opinions about the objectives and motives of regional 
integration in East Asia. An overwhelming consensus tends to regard 
economical calculations as the most important motivation. Yes, for many years 
the economic rationality looks imperative. But, with the profound 
transformations taking place in the region in the last decade, security is 
emerging to become one of the key prominent motives driving towards regional 
integration.  
 
The lack of institutionalized polity 
As the paper demonstrates, the region’s economic integration was market-driven 
linking with the rise of major economic powers and with the division of labour 
and production relations led by these powers. Regional integration was slowly 
built up without institutionalized coordination even between the monetary and 
trade initiatives. 
 
There are currently two processes driving further towards to Asian regionalism 
at sub-regional levels: top-down regional and governmental cooperation fostered 
by organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 
other bottom-up economic integration through cross-border investment and the 
establishment of regional production networks. The Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-98 played also a role in pushing the region into forming trade and financial 
agreement in one way or another including the establishment of a regional 
surveillance mechanism, the introduction of a regional liquidity support system 
(CMI) and Asian bond market development. 
 
An important step to further economic regionalism is the formation of several 
bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) including the negotiations for sub-
regional FTAs. Since then, the ten ASEAN countries have initiated a regular 
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series of meetings at the cabinet and head-of-government levels with their 
counterparts from Japan, China, and Korea. The development is also followed 
by some parallel structures: ASEAN10+1 (ASEAN 10 countries + China), 
ASEAN10+3 (ASEAN 10 countries + China, South Korea and Japan) and 
ASEAN10+6 (ASEAN 10 countries + China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, and India)  
 
However, despite the fact that the organization of ASEAN has been playing an 
active role in sub-regional integration in the past decades, and in recent years the 
organization demonstrates a dynamic facilitating function in East Asia 
regionalization process, the “ASEAN+” model still has many structural 
problems. One of the central problems is the leadership issue, because most 
ASEAN countries are small countries and it is beyond their political and 
economic capacity to lead the big countries in the process of regional integration 
and to construct an effective regional security order. Accordingly, the ASEAN’s 
inadequate leadership authority is unsurprisingly reflected by the limited role it 
can play in diplomatic balance among big powers. 
 
The United States as an avoidable “remote control” 
The restoration and prosperity of the key economic powers of East Asia (Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan) in the post-war period were realized as a result of the 
impact of restoring global stability alleviated by reconstruction funds provided 
by the United States whose post-war foreign and economic policies were aimed 
at fostering developmentalist, authoritarian and anti-Communist states in 
different parts of the world.  
 
In Europe American “Marshall Aid” was used to revive the Western European 
industries within the possibly shortest time so as to eventually block Communist 
expansion. In East Asia the pivotal object of American post-war policy was 
basically the same as its policy in Europe: that is to revive the Japan-centred 
capitalist regional economies including South Korea and Taiwan. Under 
American protection, external military threats and the internal danger of 
communist expansion were substantially reduced in these two regions. The 
burden of the allied countries’ military expenses was also greatly reduced by the 
American military presence. American military bases have been documented to 
have not only protected these countries but also provided them with economic 
benefits such as employment. Even now, the withdrawal of American military 
forces would be considered as a substantial economic loss. 
 
The end of the Cold War also marks the end of American geopolitical rationality 
for the region’s take-off and prosperity. America’s current global strategic 
policy is based on deregulation (Haass,1997), i.e. no longer regulated by 
superpower rivalry and transnational liberalism (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995) 
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in which nations interact in compliance with the rules and standards endorsed by 
the Washington Consensus. Thus, it is argued that the shift of the power base of 
the new US hegemony from hegemonic order/stability (balance of power under 
nation-state structure in a bipolar world) to hegemonic liberalism and market 
economies (imbalance of power under transnational structure in a multipolar 
global economy) is one of the important factors contributing to the East Asian 
financial crisis in 1997.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the acknowledged weakening of the US global influence, 
the Chicago Survey in 2008 indicates that people in this regional still perceive 
the United States as either the first or second most influential economic power in 
Asia and rank it as their most important 
trading partner. A vast majorities 
surveyed believe that it is somewhat 
important for the young generations to 
learn English for the sake of their future 
career. Many Asians would still identity 
the United States as either their first or 
second choice foreign destination for 
higher education for their children since 
U.S. universities score the highest for 
their perceived quality (Survey 2008: 6-
7). Albeit the rise of China’s economic 
influence in the region, the US still 
remains to be most influential in 
perceptions of its diplomatic, political, 
and human capital soft power. Fig. 6 indicates that very few people view the US 
influence in the region has decreased over the last decade, and most of them 
even regard the US influence as being either remained the same or even 
increased. 
 
Therefore, it is even legitimate to ask the question: Can East Asian regionalism 
be realized without the United States? Even today, the US is still the largest 
export market for the key countries in the region. In addition, the US has much 
more closer political and military alliance with South Korea and Japan. Apart 
from the economic rationalities, the United States will have to both involve in 
and regulate East Asian affairs in order to make sure, for the sake of its own 
global interest, that China is becoming a responsible regional player in East Asia 
and a rational stakeholder in the international system. Therefore, the US 
strategic position in East Asian regional integration is still an unknown factor. 
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Political, territorial and historical obstacles 
As an extension to the previously mentioned security issues as unresolved 
problems in the regional integration process, other diversified political and 
security factors deserve equal scrutiny. Will common regional economic 
interests pressure governments to look beyond territorial disputes, historical 
memories and nationalism? As long as Japan’s historical crime is still not clearly 
and sincerely acknowledged by the Japanese government, the fundamental 
political distrust among major powers of the regional will not easily disappear. 
Otherwise, regional integration in East Asia can only remain at the level of 
market interaction without political and cultural foundation. 
 
Globalization and the post-Cold War power relations in East Asia with the 
disappearing of the balance of power necessity among world powers are paving 
the way for traditional international conflicts over territories and natural 
resources. Furthermore, severe economic competition and rapid economic 
growth in this region have intensified rising competition for fish, petroleum, gas 
and other resources and at the same time are spurring emotional nationalism in 
the region especially among China, Japan and South Korea, leading to the 
aggravation of long-standing disputes over territorial claims and history 
interpretations. Countries in this region, weak or powerful, rich or poor, are 
seeking ways to extend their power beyond their territorial waters. The South 
China Sea, the East China Sea Shore and the Sprately Islands are at present the 
hot spots for possible confrontations among a number of countries. 
 
Historically China was the dominant regional power both politically, 
economically and culturally, whereas Japan began to emerge as a military and 
economic power since the Meiji Restoration7 in the later 19th century. Right 
now, it is first time in the history of East Asia that Japan and China are 
becoming “two tigers in the same mountain”8 – a rivalry competition. The 
growing economic interdependence among China, Japan and South Korea since 
the end of the Cold War has not been matched by a corresponding improvement 
in relations in socio-political and socio-cultural spheres. Without substantial 
foundations and levels of social, intellectual and political trust these three great 
countries will not be able to overcome the historical problems making a true 
                                                          
7  It refers to the period of the enlightened reign of Emperor Meiji (1868-1912) during 
which Japan started a series of modernization processes and rose to become a great 
regional power.  
8    It echoes the Chinese proverb “a mountain cannot be occupied by two tigers.” Here, it 
questions the possibility of two equally powerful countries engaging in cooperation rather 
than in a zero-sum competition. 
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full-fledged regionalism in East Asia unreachable. Other countries in the region 
do not have sufficient confidence, nor do they have the economic power to play 
the leadership role. 
 
Contradictions in economic levels, divisions of labour and other diversified 
factors 
Unlike the EU and NAFTA, economies of East Asia are too diversified in terms 
of economic size and development level as well as living standard. On the one 
hand, the region has two of the global economic giants – Japan and China, more 
advanced economy – South Korea, Singapore, etc; on the other hand, it also has 
world’s poorest countries – Cambodia, Laos and Burma, etc. Many countries are 
still struggling with political stability and with serious poverty concerns. 
 
Although intra-regional economic interdependence in East Asia has the 
appearance of a well-organized structure, further studies and examinations can 
disclose some embedded contradictions. The fact that the final products of 
different stages go through production processes in many countries in the region 
- indicates that this new division of labour is both horizontal in the sense that the 
entire industry or production line is passed on, and vertical in another sense that 
the sub-processes may be passed on to other countries. It must be seen that the 
region's economies are not in well-balanced harmony but are more in 
competition with one another in terms of labour cost, labour talent, seeking 
markets for export, technological upgrading, etc. 
 
Other obvious factors blocking a full regional integration are vast differences in 
many key areas, such as political systems, social structure and cultural values, 
which make it impossible to reach basic consensus in order to form a region-
based foreign, economic and financial policies. Most underdevelopment 
countries in the region are diversified in ecosystem, population, ethnicity, 
religion. Rather than integration obstacles they are facing more serious internal 
development problems such as emerging income gaps, environmental 
degradation, urbanization and congestion, and various social problems. 
 
 
Conclusion remarks: political integration in East Asia desirable or 
possible? 
This paper analyzes China’s role in regional integration in East Asia as a new 
engine in promoting economic and trade growth. On the one hand, China’s 
closer integration with economies in the region, along with a trend toward more 
assertive political and diplomatic manner, has contributed to great optimism for 
the economic and political regionalization in East Asia. On the other hand, 
China’s rise has raised a leadership problem that may constitute an unknown 
factor on the process of increased regional integration in East Asia. Regional 
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integration has reached such a historical stage in East Asia where more structure 
and leadership is needed. China’s future role is vital but hard to define. 
However, one thing is sure that China will continue to act as a facilitator and 
enforcer of regional cooperation. 
 
As the neo-functional theories point out, the development of regional supra-
national institutions was not historically an initial goal of regional integration 
but was out of functional imperatives (political or economic necessity). 
However, a crucial question to bear in mind is whether political integration in 
East Asia has ever been an objective of the regional integration project? In the 
case of the EU, supra-national sovereignty was historically already part of the 
initial ideals behind the integration project.   
 
Nevertheless, many fundamental differences with deep-seated difficulties and 
obstacles between countries in the region are too wide to be bridged, such as 
vast diversities of economic level, political system, cultural value, security 
concern, etc. Currently, some sub-regional integration movements of free trade 
are developing. It is interesting to observe whether these sub-regional 
movements can generate the positive spill-over effect to eventually reach the 
regional integration at a higher institutionalized level. 
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